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How and under what conditions does legitimacy affect processes of international institutional change? This article specifies
and evaluates three causal mechanisms by which variation in legitimacy induces institutional change in international organi-
zations (IOs) and argues that an important, yet hitherto neglected, source of legitimacy-based change is cognitive in nature.
Using survival analysis, we evaluate these mechanisms with a novel dataset on the establishment of parliamentary institutions
in thirty-six regional organizations between 1950 and 2010. We find that the empowerment of supranational secretariats, en-
gagement with the European Union, and parliamentarization in an organization’s neighborhood increase the likelihood of
regional parliamentarization. This suggests that legitimacy judgments that draw on cognitive referents provide an important
source of international institutional change. We illustrate the underlying cognitive emulation mechanism with a case study of
parliamentarization in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
How and under what conditions does legitimacy affect
processes of international institutional change? This article
develops and evaluates three causal mechanisms by which
variation in legitimacy induces institutional change in inter-
national organizations (IOs) and argues that an important,
yet hitherto neglected, source of legitimacy-based change is
cognitive in nature.
Current debates about the downsides of globalization, the
increasing engagement and influence of rising powers in
IOs, as well as the rise of populist challenges to interna-
tionalism reflect the view held by many stakeholders that
global governance is facing a legitimacy crisis that can only
be ameliorated through institutional change. The schol-
arly literature in international relations (IR), however, has
not considered how actual or anticipated legitimacy loss
can itself be a factor promoting institutional change. There
is extensive literature documenting and explaining institu-
tional changes that have led to increased IO authority—
such as the emergence of stronger dispute-settlement insti-
tutions, more independent IO bureaucracies, or the growth
of pooled decision-making competences (see, for example,
Haftel 2013; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019). And recent
literature theorizes and measures how those institutional
changes have impacted perceptions of IO legitimacy, with
some scholars arguing that the growing authority of IOs is
leading to increased contestation over the terms of interna-
tional cooperation (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012;
Morse and Keohane 2014). If, however, as the literature has
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shown, legitimacy is an important source of IO stability and
authority, then we should expect variation in legitimacy itself
to be a potential explanation of institutional change. But
explanations of institutional change within IR scholarship
have primarily focused on the role of power and interests as
explanatory factors; the field lacks attention to legitimacy-
based sources of international institutional change.
We argue that variation in legitimacy can help to explain
when institutional change occurs and what kind of institu-
tional change will be attempted. We explicate three mech-
anisms of legitimacy-driven institutional change that we de-
rive from two distinct models of legitimacy. The first model,
which reflects the dominant position in the literature, is
what we call the congruence model of legitimacy. In the congru-
ence model, legitimacy judgments are based on an evalua-
tion of the congruence or match between an organization’s
features and the underlying norms of its stakeholders. This
model assumes that actors are primarily concerned with the
internal consistency of an institution (i.e., that legitimacy is
essentially a self-referential assessment). It implies two dis-
tinct causal mechanisms by which legitimacy concerns can
prompt institutional change. First, pressures for reform can
be expected when changes to an organization’s features ren-
der that IO no longer aligned with the norms of appropriate
governance held by stakeholders—such as when an IO en-
hances its autonomy in the absence of accountability mech-
anisms. Second, pressures for reform can be expected when
the underlying norms of stakeholders change against static
institutional features—such as when member states begin to
value democratic governance norms, including representa-
tion and deliberation, within traditionally top-down IOs.
The inward-looking congruence model neglects to con-
sider that legitimacy judgments may depend on the degree
of perceived consistency of an organization with other or-
ganizations in the organizational environment (Kahneman
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Figure 1. Cumulative number of parliamentary institutions
in regional organizations, 1950–2010
2003; Fiske and Taylor 2013). This insight is captured in
a second model that we call the cognitive model of legiti-
macy (Lenz and Viola 2017). The cognitive model empha-
sizes that, because information is incomplete and complex,
available cognitive schemata should shape legitimacy judg-
ments. This model thus implies a third mechanism, namely
that unfavorable comparisons between an organization and
the core features of exemplary reference organizations in
the environment can create the perception of a legitimacy
deficit that in turn prompts institutional change. In this case
we would expect the type of change to be a move toward im-
itation or conformity with the formal structure of the refer-
ent organization (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
The purpose of this article is to theoretically specify the
distinct mechanisms through which changes in legitimacy
can drive institutional change and to establish the empirical
plausibility and relative significance of these mechanisms. In
order to empirically test the value of these legitimacy mecha-
nisms as explanations for institutional change, we assess how
legitimacy concerns shape a particular case of institutional
change—the adoption of parliamentary institutions within
regional organizations.1 In contrast to other types of insti-
tutional changes, such as the creation of dispute-settlement
mechanisms or the strengthening of international bureau-
cracies, the adoption of parliamentary institutions offers a
promising case for testing arguments about the legitimacy-
based sources of institutional change because their func-
tional value, as conceived by standard delegation theories,
is limited, as we detail below. We focus on regional or-
ganizations because that is where most parliamentary in-
stitutions have been created and where the trend is most
significant.2 Based on data from the Measurement of Inter-
national Authority (MIA) dataset, which encompasses thirty-
six regional organizations with “standing in international
politics” (Hooghe, Marks, Lenz, et al. 2017, 16), Figure 1
shows the establishment of regional parliamentary institu-
tions between 1950 and 2010 (see Online Appendix A for a
complete list). Whereas only one regional organization fea-
tured a parliamentary institution in 1950, this number rose
to six in 1990 and to seventeen in 2010. As the number of re-
gional organizations also grew during this period, in relative
1Such institutions have attracted surprisingly little attention in the literature.
But see Costa, Dri, and Stavridis (2013) for a descriptive analysis and Rocabert,
Schimmelfennig, Crasnic, et al. (2018) for a theoretical and systematically com-
parative analysis.
2Only very few global organizations have created parliamentary institutions;
for example, the International Labor Organization.
terms the increase is from 25 percent in 1950 to 56 percent
in 2010. How can legitimacy concerns help to explain this
evolution?
We posit that the widespread adoption of regional par-
liamentary institutions constitutes a legitimation strategy
that governments use in response to a decline in an or-
ganization’s legitimacy, or legitimacy loss. We translate the
three mechanisms outlined above into distinct hypotheses
to explain the creation of regional parliamentary institu-
tions and then subject them to a systematic empirical test
by drawing on a novel dataset.3 The statistical results lead
to two significant contributions. First, the results confirm
that changes in organizational procedures produce pres-
sures for institutional change when they render the IO no
longer aligned with dominant standards of legitimacy. Sec-
ond, the findings indicate that comparative judgments of le-
gitimacy based on changes in available cognitive referents
in the external environment—what we term the cognitive
emulation mechanism—are at least as important for under-
standing variation in legitimacy and pressures for institu-
tional change, if not more so, than are self-referential base-
lines that derive from change within the organization itself.
Taken together, our statistical analysis suggests that the little-
studied cognitive model deserves closer empirical scrutiny as
an explanation of legitimacy-driven institutional change.
Accordingly, we study the cognitive legitimacy model
through a single case study of regional parliamentarization
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In
this case, a regional parliamentary institution emerged de-
spite having a largely nondemocratic membership and lim-
ited supranational competence. The cognitive model helps
to explain this counterintuitive outcome by showing how
perceived deviations of ASEAN’s institutional status quo
from external referents contributed to its loss of legitimacy
with important elite audiences inside and outside of the
organization, which member-state governments eventually
sought to reverse by emulating specific institutional struc-
tures from other regional organizations that appeared more
legitimate and successful.
We first develop the two models of legitimacy as an expla-
nation of institutional change, we then derive from them
several legitimacy-based hypotheses of regional parliamen-
tarization, which we subsequently evaluate empirically in a
statistical analysis followed by a case study. The conclusion
summarizes the argument and outlines its wider theoretical
implications.
Legitimacy as an Explanation for Institutional Change
The institutional literature within IR has come to recognize
the significance of legitimacy for sustaining and stabilizing
institutions (see, for example, Tallberg and Zürn 2018). Le-
gitimacy refers to the recognition of an institution’s “right
to rule” based on its normative appropriateness. Legitimacy
contributes to organizational stability because it generates
voluntary compliance based on a sense of appropriateness,
rather than compliance based on coercion or self-interest
(Hurd 1999; Buchanan and Keohane 2006, 408–10). Thus,
legitimacy can be a powerful tool for inducing actor support
for and compliance with an organization when coercion and
self-interest are absent or weak (Hurd 1999).
3Rocabert et al. (2018) also study the establishment of parliamentary insti-
tutions in international organizations through a mixed-methods research design
and advance a legitimation argument. Their study is more narrowly interested in
testing existing explanations for why international parliamentary institutions are
established, rather than when and how legitimacy considerations affect interna-
tional institutional change.
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Given the relevance of legitimacy for organizational
stability and functioning, we should expect institutions to
be sensitive to changes in legitimacy. This requires thinking
of legitimacy not just as variable across institutions but also
as variable within institutions across time (Rixen and Viola
2016, 20). In other words, legitimacy is not an inherent or
constant characteristic of institutions. Moreover, it opens
the possibility of thinking about legitimacy not just as
something to be explained, but as an independent variable
in its own right. Most of the current literature is motivated
by concerns about the legitimacy crisis of IOs, seeking to
explain when and why actors perceive an IO to be more or
less legitimate (Binder and Heupel 2015). But if variation in
legitimacy—similar to changes in the distribution of power
or changes in functional utility—can affect an institutional
equilibrium, then we should be able to theorize when
and under what circumstances changes in legitimacy are
likely to lead to institutional change.4 Whereas power-based
accounts view institutional change as a strategy employed
by hegemonic actors to secure their dominant position, and
interest-based accounts conceive of institutional change as a
collective attempt to enhance the efficiency of cooperation,
legitimacy-based explanations interpret institutional change
as a collective attempt to enhance the normative appropri-
ateness of an organization in the eyes of important inside
and outside stakeholders. Institutional change can be a
strategic response to a perceived legitimacy deficit premised
on exploiting prevalent norms of appropriateness. Sociolog-
ical theories of institutions have long emphasized the idea
that “organizations often adopt a new institutional practice
. . . because it enhances the social legitimacy of the orga-
nization or its participants” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 949).
Most prominently, organizational theorists in sociology
have argued that the ceremonial imitation of institutional
features serves to legitimize an organization within a wider
organizational field and improve an organization’s chances
of survival, independently of their functional value (Meyer
and Rowan 1977).
In order to theorize the effects of legitimacy on institu-
tional change, it is necessary to specify the sources of vari-
ation in legitimacy. Existing literature suggests that legit-
imacy is based on congruence between an organization’s
features and the standards of appropriateness held by rel-
evant organizational stakeholders. Drawing on ideas from
Max Weber and following Talcott Parsons, sociologists un-
derstand legitimacy as “congruence of an organization with
social laws, norms, and values” (Deephouse and Suchman
2008, 50; see also Beetham 1991, 11). If an organization’s
features—its rules and procedures—and the underlying
norms held by important organizational stakeholders cor-
respond, stable organizational legitimacy results; when cor-
respondence weakens, organizational legitimacy becomes
precarious. This implies two possible mechanisms through
which a decline in legitimacy compared to the status quo
ante will produce pressures for change. First, legitimacy loss
can result from a change in organizational features against
a fixed set of norms (institutional mechanism). Second, le-
gitimacy loss can result from a change in the underlying
standard of appropriateness against fixed organizational fea-
tures (normative mechanism).
4Explanations of international institutional change typically draw on power
and interests as key variables. Power-oriented accounts emphasize changes in the
distribution of power inside and outside of IOs (see, for example, Gruber 2000),
whereas interest-based explanations highlight changes that enhance the func-
tional need for more authoritative IOs (for example, Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal
2013; Koremenos 2005).
These two mechanisms imply that actors are fully in-
formed and that congruence can be readily and objec-
tively ascertained by assessing the match between features
and norms. As Suchman (1995, 574) recognizes, however,
“[a]n organization may diverge dramatically from societal
norms yet retain legitimacy because the divergence goes un-
noticed.” This is because, as Lenz and Viola (2017, 947)
note, “the evaluative assessment of congruence—that is, the
meaning of congruence for legitimacy—is ultimately a per-
ceptual judgment.” Research in cognitive psychology has
studied the role that heuristics play in forming judgments
in situations of uncertainty and incomplete information and
offers insights into how legitimacy may be perceived. A core
insight of this literature is that human judgment does not
occur in a vacuum but actors interpret information by eval-
uating it in relation to reference points that are available in
the environment, which take the form of representative pro-
totypes or exemplars (Kahneman 2003, 703; see also Tversky
and Kahneman 1974; Fiske and Taylor 2013). Thus, in addi-
tion to the self-referential mechanisms of the congruence
model, the cognitive model yields a third possible mech-
anism whereby legitimacy judgments about one organiza-
tion may depend on its degree of correspondence with ex-
emplary reference organizations in the environment (see
Goetze and Rittberger 2010, 40; see also Weyland 2008).
These three mechanisms are summarized in Figure 2.
Explaining Regional Parliamentarization:
Legitimacy-Based Sources of Institutional Change
Parliamentary institutions are institutionalized fora for reg-
ular multilateral deliberation composed of elected repre-
sentatives generally drawn from national parliaments.5 The
competences of these institutions tend to revolve around
debate and consultation rather than legislation.6 These in-
stitutions are typically entitled to discuss issues of com-
mon concern, to receive information about governmen-
tal decision-making in the regional organization, and to
make recommendations to governments. They write their
own rules of procedure and decide how to distribute their
own budget. Regional parliamentarization is the process by
which a parliamentary institution acquires formalized access
to participate in the decision-making of a regional organiza-
tion. What explains the decision to grant parliaments this
access?
Conventional delegation theory has trouble identifying
the conditions under which governments create regional
parliamentary institutions because, compared to other in-
stitutions such as secretariats, expert advisory bodies, or
courts, parliaments offer few efficiency-enhancing benefits
while generating potentially significant sovereignty costs.
Parliaments do not provide benefits such as facilitating
the coordination of organizational activities, setting the
agenda, providing policy relevant expertise, or monitoring
and enforcing agreements—“gains from specialization” reg-
ularly attributed to such institutions by delegation theory
(Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, et al. 2006, 13; Pollack 2003).
Implementation knowledge and compliance information,
two functions recently identified to explain the involve-
ment of transnational actors in international cooperation
5Only four international parliaments are directly elected: the European Par-
liament, since 1979; the Central American Parliament, since 1992; the Andean
Parliament, since 2008 (in three out of four member states); and the Mercosur
Parliament, since 2016 (in two out of four member states).
6Only two regional parliaments have legislative competences: the European
Parliament and the Legislative Assembly of the East African Community.
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Figure 2. Three mechanisms of legitimacy-driven institutional change
(Tallberg, Sommerer, Squatrito, et al. 2014, 754), appear to
be more applicable to “specialized” nongovernmental orga-
nizations or multinational corporations than to parliaments.
In contrast to the involvement of transnational actors, the
functional advantages of including parliaments “is more
difficult to identify” (Tallberg et al. 2014, 754). Instead of en-
hancing the efficiency of international organizations, parlia-
mentary involvement in decision-making increases the like-
lihood of complications and delays because the interests of
another actor, often with preferences distinct from govern-
ments, must be taken into account. As one analyst notes, in-
ternational parliamentary institutions “counteract or at least
slow down a variety of forces pushing regional economic in-
tegration” (Slaughter 2004, 107).
At the same time, the potential sovereignty costs of re-
gional parliamentarization tend to be high due to the
distinct composition of parliamentary institutions. Even
though governments empower international parliamentary
institutions (and have the power to withdraw their compe-
tences), these institutions are not the agents of governments
but of national parliaments and, ultimately, of the citizens
of member states. Whereas governments generally control
the selection of top personnel in secretariats and courts
ex ante, and can remove staff ex post, such control mecha-
nisms do not exist in international parliaments, which are
generally appointed by national parliaments. Because gov-
ernments lack the mechanisms that would allow them to
align their preferences with those of international parlia-
ments, their preferences are more likely to be misaligned.
Self-reinforcing empowerment dynamics are more likely
to occur as nonstate actors gain access to organizational
decision-making—what Hawkins (2008, 374) terms “insti-
tutional permeability.” The European Parliament’s institu-
tional trajectory from a consultative to a legislative organ
is a prime example of the encroachment of parliamentary
actors upon executive dominance in international cooper-
ation, and this mechanism has also been documented else-
where (Rittberger 2005; Hawkins 2008).
A dearth of efficiency-related benefits and a high de-
gree of independence from governments imply that purely
efficiency-based theories are insufficient to explain regional
parliamentarization, as readily recognized by theorists work-
ing on the European Union (EU) (see, for example, Pollack
2003, 204). Instead, the establishment of international par-
liamentary institutions has an important legitimacy dimen-
sion. In fact, the main rationale of these institutions is to en-
hance popular participation in the process of regional co-
operation. The Mercosur Parliament, for example, explic-
itly sees its purpose as contributing to “democracy, partici-
pation, representation, transparency, and social legitimacy
in the process of regional integration” (Constitutive Proto-
col of the Mercosur Parliament, preamble our translation).
Under which conditions do governments perceive a need to
legitimize regional organizations by establishing parliamen-
tary institutions?
Three Legitimacy-Based Explanations of Regional Parliamentarization
Applying the two models of legitimacy-driven institutional
change outlined above, we can specify three testable hy-
potheses regarding how legitimacy concerns can drive the
establishment of regional parliamentary institutions. These
explanations share the assumption that a decline in orga-
nizational legitimacy is an important source of institutional
change in regional organizations and interpret the estab-
lishment of parliamentary institutions as a legitimation strat-
egy used by governments to counter a loss of organizational
legitimacy. The three explanations differ, however, in the
sources of legitimacy loss they posit and the ways in which
these translate into institutional change.
SUPRANATIONALIZATION
Derived from the congruence model, the first explanation
of regional parliamentarization emphasizes incongruence
as the result of changes in core organizational procedures
against a fixed set of underlying norms. In this sequence, rel-
evant organizational stakeholders interpret organizational
features (perhaps ones created on efficiency grounds)
as violating underlying social norms and therefore ques-
tion the organization’s legitimacy—legitimacy loss which
governments seek to mitigate through additional institu-
tional change.
With respect to regional organizations, this explanation
starts from the assumption that the legitimacy of regional
organizations hinges on the ability of societal actors to
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hold organizations accountable (Grant and Keohane 2005).
In “classical” regional organizations that operate as inter-
governmental bargaining fora, every government holds a
veto over collective decisions and, therefore, accountabil-
ity can be fully secured through domestic channels. This
logic breaks down, however, when regional organizations be-
come supranational—that is, when they gain independence
from direct government control. Such procedural change
can occur in two ways. First, the loss of control is particu-
larly acute when governments attempt to facilitate decision-
making by ceding their veto over organizational decisions
(i.e., when decision-making moves from consensual to ma-
joritarian procedures) (Rixen and Zangl 2013, 368). Sec-
ond, it can result from delegation to independent secre-
tariats with agenda-setting competences that allow them to
influence organizational decisions (see Hooghe, Lenz, and
Marks 2019, ch. 3). In both cases, as societal actors lose
their ability to ensure organizational accountability through
domestic channels, they increasingly place legitimacy de-
mands on the organization (Zürn 2004), generating pres-
sures for institutional change. Supranational organizations
require additional institutional channels to allow societal
actors to hold their governments accountable (Rittberger
2005; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006, 1160; Slaughter
2004, 125–29; Zur¨n et al. 2012). Establishing a regional par-
liamentary institution is one plausible such channel. This
discussion leads to two testable hypotheses:
H1a: The likelihood of regional parliamentarization increases as
regional organizations pool authority, ceteris paribus.
H1b: The likelihood of regional parliamentarization increases as
regional organizations delegate authority to independent regional
institutions, ceteris paribus.
DEMOCRATIZATION
Also derived from the congruence model, the second expla-
nation of regional parliamentarization highlights a change
in the underlying standard of appropriateness against fixed
organizational procedures. In this sequence, the standard of
appropriateness by which organizational stakeholders eval-
uate the legitimacy of an organization shifts and no longer
matches dominant organizational features, leading to pres-
sures for institutional change to conform to the new stan-
dard. When member states democratize, for example, or-
ganizational stakeholders expect organizational procedures
to change to conform to democratic standards. Grigorescu
(2015) shows how the rise of democratic norms creates pres-
sure for IO institutional change. Tallberg and colleagues
demonstrate how IOs have opened up to civil society ac-
tors partly in response to stronger democratic participation
norms (Tallberg et al. 2014; see also Tallberg, Sommerer,
and Squatrito 2016).
With respect to regional organizations, this explanation
starts from the assumption that the legitimacy of regional
organizations depends on whether they align with the social
norms embodied in domestic political regimes. Liberal the-
ories of IR have long posited that states aim to “establish
a basic compatibility between domestic and international
policy objectives” (Katzenstein 1977, 588). As norms of ap-
propriate behavior change within member states, organiza-
tional stakeholders apply these emerging norms to judge the
legitimacy of regional organizations. When member states
democratize, we can expect relevant stakeholders to de-
mand a realignment of regional organizations with these
norms. As Grigorescu (2015, 5) argues, domestic norms in-
fluence the design of IOs both through actors who have in-
ternalized those norms and actors who see strategic reasons
for adopting them.7 Given that “parliaments are the tradi-
tional locus for legitimation in modern democracies” (Kraft-
Kasack 2008, 535), this logic predicts that domestic democ-
ratization makes efforts to create parliamentary institutions
in regional organizations more likely. This leads to a second
testable proposition:
H2: The likelihood of regional parliamentarization increases as
the membership of a regional organization becomes more democratic,
ceteris paribus.
COGNITIVE EMULATION
Derived from the cognitive model, the third explanation
emphasizes incongruence that arises from changing cogni-
tive referents against fixed organizational procedures and
constant standards of appropriateness. In this sequence,
dissimilarities between a regional organization and the
available reference organizations on the part of relevant
organizational stakeholders triggers a decline of perceived
legitimacy in the regional organization, which governments
seek to mitigate by emulating available institutional forms
from the referent, while adapting them to suit local contexts
(Meyer and Rowan 1977; Rüland 2014). Poole, for example,
has shown how the creation of a human rights body in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was an
attempt “to improve the legitimacy of ASEAN and its norms,
as perceived by extraregional actors” (Poole 2015, 357).
This explanation starts from the assumption that an as-
sessment of congruence between organizational features
and underlying standards of appropriateness necessarily re-
lies on some cognitive aid that gives meaning to informa-
tion. Using environmentally available reference points pro-
vides actors with cues about how to judge legitimacy. As
Khong (1992, 13) notes, “[m]atching each new instance
with instances stored in memory is then a major way human
beings comprehend the world.” To the extent that impor-
tant organizational stakeholders observe institutional differ-
ences between their organization and the reference organi-
zation in the field, they perceive its legitimacy to be wanting
and put pressure on the organization to align its design ac-
cordingly.
A referent is likely to be an exemplar within an organiza-
tional field—an organization that is particularly successful
and prominent. We suggest that, in the realm of regional
organizations, the European Union forms the major ex-
emplar. It is the most successful regional organization in
the world and is “often (if only implicitly) seen as the
‘gold standard’ of regional integration” (Sbragia 2008, 33).
Thus, familiarity with the organizational procedures of the
European Union affects perceptions of the legitimacy of
other regional organizations (see Lenz 2018). A referent
may also be an organizational form that is familiar in the
environment. Familiarity influences how actors assess the
normative desirability of an organizational form (Zajonc
1968; Aldrich and Fiol 1994). The more familiar stake-
holders are with a specific institutional form—such as
international parliamentary institutions—the more likely
they will see the presence of such institutions as legitimate
and their absence as problematic. This discussion leads to
two further testable propositions:
7 Similarly, our explanation does not necessarily require an internalization of
democratic norms by state representatives themselves. While norm internalization
is one potential motivation, it is also compatible with our explanation that govern-
ments respond to demands for democratization by organizational audiences for
strategic reasons.
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H3a: The likelihood of regional parliamentarization increases as
actors in other organizations become familiar with parliamentariza-
tion in the European Union, ceteris paribus.
H3b: The likelihood of regional parliamentarization increases as
the incidence of parliamentarization in an organization’s external
environment grows, ceteris paribus.
Regional Parliamentarization: A Quantitative Test
To test these competing hypotheses, we use the MIA dataset
that contains information on thirty-six regional organiza-
tions between 1950 or the year of their establishment and
2010. The MIA dataset defines a regional organization as
a formal international organization composed of three or
more geographically proximate states (Pevehouse, Nord-
strom, and Warnke 2004; Haftel 2013, 394). Sampling is
based on the Correlates of War dataset and focuses on
organizations that “have standing in international politics.”
While this may raise issues about representativeness and
selection bias, this focus is justified by the practical need
to focus on organizations that leave some footprint in the
primary sources given the detailed information involved
in the dataset and the plausible consideration that states
are more likely to care about organizations that have some
resources and status (Hooghe et al. 2017, 16). Moreover,
the sample (listed in Online Appendix A) covers organi-
zations on all continents and is more encompassing than
most datasets previously used to evaluate hypotheses about
regional organizations (e.g., Haftel 2013; Gray 2014).
In line with our theoretical approach, our empirical strat-
egy is to measure the hypothesized sources of variation in
the legitimacy of regional organizations rather than seeking
to tap legitimacy or legitimacy loss directly in the quantita-
tive analysis. The subsequent case study illustrates in detail
how legitimacy loss leads to institutional change. In this sec-
tion, we first describe how we operationalize the variables




This study focuses on regional parliamentarization, defined
as the process by which a parliamentary institution acquires
formalized access to participate in the decision-making of a
regional organization. This involves, at a minimum, a par-
liamentary institution having a formally codified right to is-
sue recommendations to the core decision-making organs,
for which an institutionalized channel of interaction ex-
ists. Thus, we conceive of the dependent variable—regional
parliamentarization—as binary, giving it a value of 1 if such a
regional parliamentary institution exists, and 0 otherwise.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
We operationalize each of the three mechanisms of regional
parliamentarization in at least two different ways to enhance
the confidence in our results. First, the supranationalization
mechanism is composed of pooling and delegation, which
are operationalized drawing on the MIA dataset. Pooling
is an aggregate index that captures the extent to which
collective decision-making bodies in regional organiza-
tions deviate from the consensus principle in six decision
areas: membership accession, membership suspension,
policy-making, budgetary allocation and noncompliance,
and constitutional reform. The measure ranges from 0
to 1, though the actual maximum is 0.5, reached by the
African Union after 2005. Delegation is an aggregate index
of the formal delegation of competences to the general
secretariat, which is widely considered the main agent in
regional decision-making (Barnett and Finnemore 2004;
Rittberger 2005). It gauges the extent to which secretariats
can set the agenda in the six aforementioned decision areas,
whether they dispose of executive powers, and whether they
enjoy exclusive executive and agenda-setting competence in
policy-making. This index ranges between 0 and 1, though
the maximum is 0.72, reached by the Economic Commu-
nity of Western African States after 2007 (for details, see
Online Appendix B).
Second, the democratization mechanism captures the de-
gree to which the membership of a regional organization
is democratic. We use two standard measures to capture
this feature, drawing on the conventionally used Polity IV
dataset on regime type (Pevehouse 2005; Tallberg et al.
2016). The main operationalization is average democracy,
which is the mean level of democracy in a regional organiza-
tion. The measure ranges from 1 to 21, which is an additive
scale of Polity IV’s separate autocracy and democracy scores
(range 0 to 10). An alternative operationalization is demo-
cratic density, which is the proportion of member states that
are considered full democracies or democracies (democracy
score higher than 6) according to Polity IV’s regime typol-
ogy. The advantage of this operationalization is that it gives
a clearer picture of the democratic “quality” of a regional or-
ganization and the balance between democracies and non-
democracies.
Third, the cognitive emulation mechanism captures the ex-
tent to which actors become familiar with parliamentariza-
tion in the European Union as the main exemplar among
regional organizations (Hypothesis 3a) and the incidence of
parliamentarization in an organization’s geographic neigh-
borhood (Hypothesis 3b). We operationalize EU emulation
by capturing the extent of institutionalized engagement be-
tween the EU and other regional organizations. Drawing
on data by Lenz and Burilkov (2017), we construct an in-
dex that measures two aspects of EU engagement: the EU’s
financial support of other regional organizations and the
existence of institutionalized contacts between EU represen-
tatives and their counterparts. Combining these two com-
ponents, the variable EU engagement is quantitative and
ranges from 0 to 1, while the two components are normal-
ized and weighted equally. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.7025,
which indicates acceptable scalability, and we use the com-
ponents separately in robustness checks. The variable EU
engagement is detailed in Online Appendix B and captures
the intuition that funding from the EU to support regional
institution-building elsewhere and institutionalized contacts
with EU representatives increase familiarity with the EU’s
institutional framework, including its parliament.8 The vari-
able regional emulation, on the other hand, is the proportion
of regional organizations in five geographical macroregions
(Americas, Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Asia) that have
already established parliamentary institutions.
CONTROL VARIABLES
We also include several controls. First, post-1990 is a di-
chotomous variable that represents the exogenous shock
of the end of the Cold War upon the assumption that this
pivotal event may have changed the dynamics of regional
8 It is important to note that we have not found any evidence that EU funding
is made conditional on institutional reform in the image of the EU. Alter (2012,
145) makes a similar observation with regard to the transfer of EU-style courts to
Africa.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Creation of parliamentary body 0.278 0.448 0 1
Pooling 0.169 0.125 0 0.508
Delegation 0.216 0.163 0 0.787
Average democracy 12.22876 6.328 0.333 20.307
Democratic density 0.453 0.365 0 1
EU engagement 0.994 1.674 0 6
Regional emulation 0.251 0.251 0 0.8
Global emulation 0.251 0.114 0 0.5
Post-1990 0.505 0.500 0 1
GDP/capita 14911.49 17007.28 445.455 83915.59
Democratizing hegemon 0.072 0.266 0 2
Democratic hegemon 0.370 0.517 0 2
Age 26.347 20.982 1 122
Observations 1371
parliamentarization. Second, global emulation is the propor-
tion of the total number of regional organizations that have
already established parliamentary institutions, which we use
to control for the possibility that emulation is more encom-
passing than our theoretical focus on the European Union
and the respective geographic regions. Third, democratic
hegemony is a dichotomous variable that captures the pos-
sibility that parliamentarization is driven by democratic or
democratizing hegemons rather than the democratic den-
sity or average level of democracy of an organization. (For
details on variable construction, see Online Appendix B.)
This hypothesis is based upon the realist premise that great
powers may seek to externalize their domestic ideology and
force their institutional preferences upon other members of
an IO (see Moravcsik 2000). Finally, we control for GDP per
capita in a regional organization to assess the possibility that
richer organizations find it easier to create costly regional
institutions; as the distribution of GDP per capita is consid-
erably right-skewed, we use the log in the analysis. Summary
statistics of all variables used in the analysis are provided in
Table 1, and a correlation matrix is included in Online Ap-
pendix C.
Estimation and Results
Our analysis is conducted using survival methods. The unit
of interest is parliamentarization in regional organizations;
survival time is the time in years until a regional organiza-
tion institutionalizes a parliament, which is the failure event.
Our data begins in 1950, with four organizations, of which
one had a parliament, and ends in 2010 with thirty-four or-
ganizations, of which seventeen had parliaments. Observa-
tions are left-censored if the regional organization existed in
1950 and already had a parliament, which is true in the case
of the Council of Europe, and right-censored if by 2010 the
regional organization did not adopt a parliament, such as in
the cases of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the North
American Free Trade Agreement, or the Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organization.
For the main analysis, we select the semiparametric Cox
proportional hazard model, recommended and applied in
cases when there is no strong expectation of a particular dis-
tribution function for the hazard (Box-Steffenmeister and
Jones 2004; Kokkonen and Sundell 2014); in our case, this
means that we do not expect the age of the organization to
have a strong impact on the likelihood of parliamentariza-
tion. As our unit of interest, which is parliamentarization of
an organization, may only occur once in any given regional
organization, we do not adopt shared frailty models or mod-
els where each organization would have its own baseline haz-
ard. However, we use robust standard errors in order to mit-
igate heteroskedasticity; these robust standard errors in the
main analysis are highly similar to the “classical” standard
errors produced if the analysis does not include robust stan-
dard errors, indicating that our models are not misspecified.
Table 2 shows our results on five models. Model (1) covers
the supranationalization mechanism and tests pooling and
delegation. Models (2) and (3) cover the democratization
mechanism; we employ different models because democ-
racy and democratic density are highly collinear (r = 0.91).
Model (4) covers the cognitive emulation mechanism, with
EU engagement and regional emulation. Finally, Model (5)
incorporates all right-hand-side variables in a single model
to test the robustness of individual models’ results. All mod-
els include the standard battery of controls, and they have
been checked to fulfill the proportional-hazards assump-
tion, and influential observations have been identified and
removed. Finally, Table 2 shows hazard ratios, which indi-
cate that, if any given variable is more than 1, it accelerates
parliamentarization, and if it is less than 1, it slows it down.
As a baseline, the median survival time, meaning years un-
til a regional organization adopts a parliament, is forty-one
years, with a standard error of 4.2 years. Thus, parliamenta-
rization is a process that evolves over significant stretches of
time.
Our results lend strong support to the cognitive emula-
tion mechanism, some support to the supranationalization
mechanism, and little support to the democracy mecha-
nism. Regarding cognitive emulation, we find consistently
positive and strongly significant results for regional emula-
tion and EU engagement, both in Model 4 that tests only
the cognitive emulation mechanism and the fully specified
Model 5. This result bolsters Hypotheses 3a and 3b, indi-
cating that the more familiar actors become with the parlia-
mentary form in either the EU, through EU-funded experts
or contacts with EU officials, or in their geographic neigh-
borhood, the more likely they are to create regional parlia-
ments themselves. This result is consistent with the cognitive
model of legitimacy-driven institutional change, which sug-
gests that legitimacy loss may result from a decline in
congruence between an IO’s institutional features and the
institutions of important reference organizations rather
than being a fully self-referential process of assessing
whether an IO’s institutional features correspond to the
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Table 2. Determinants of regional parliamentarization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooling 0.007 (0.021)
Delegation 1.145*** (0.035) 1.105*** (0.034)
Average democracy 1.148 (0.110) 0.935 (0.101)
Democratic density 5.939 (7.962)
EU engagement 1.787*** (0.270) 1.677*** (0.283)
Regional emulation 1.062*** (0.021) 1.056* (0.032)
Global emulation 1.025 (0.043) 1.076* (0.042) 1.070* (0.042) 1.044 (0.046) 1.008 (0.061)
Post-1990 3.744 (3.224) 1.738 (1.826) 2.056 (2.097) 1.698 (1.869) 2.134 (2.439)
Democratizing hegemon 5.003*** (3.103) 2.583** (1.096) 2.883** (1.236) 2.312* (1.051) 4.251** (2.652)
Democratic hegemon 0.671 (0.536) 0.277* (0.200) 0.295* (0.208) 0.691 (0.437) 0.584 (0.564)
GDP/capita 1.070 (0.286) 0.686 (0.169) 0.733 (0.172) 0.725 (0.173) 1.254 (0.386)
N 619 619 619 619 619
Wald chi2 37.897 30.485 31.232 54.580 93.242
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: (1) Survival analysis, Cox proportional hazard models; exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. (2) Statistical significance
levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
standards of appropriateness of key organizational stake-
holders.
The supranationalization mechanism also receives some
empirical support. Model 1 indicates that the move to-
ward majoritarian decision-making (pooling) is not related
to a higher likelihood of parliamentarization, which al-
lows us to reject Hypothesis 1a, but that delegation is
a strong and highly significant predictor of regional
parliamentarization—a result confirmed in the fully spec-
ified Model 5. This result shows that organizations that
empower a general secretariat to shape the process of
regional cooperation are also faster in adopting a parlia-
mentary institution, and it suggests that Rittberger’s (2005)
argument about the sources of parliamentarization in the
European Union may be applicable more generally. This
finding also lends credence to the congruence model of
legitimacy-driven institutional change, which posits that a
change in institutional features—in this case, the empower-
ment of a regional secretariat—against constant standards
of appropriateness may trigger legitimacy loss and drive
governments to reestablish legitimacy by realigning the
organization’s institutions with these standards.
Empirical support is weak for the secondmechanism asso-
ciated with the congruence model, a change in underlying
standards of appropriateness—in our case, democratization
of an IO’s membership—against constant organizational
procedures. Indicated by Models 2, 3 and 5, democracy and
democratic density are neither significant nor strong predic-
tors, especially in Model 5, although hazard ratios are consis-
tently larger than 1. Ultimately, even for organizations with
a very high level of democracy—meaning that at least the
majority of members must be full democracies—the likeli-
hood of parliamentarization is only 15 percent higher than
that of regional organizations at the mean, substantially less
than the impact of delegation, EU engagement, or regional
emulation, as we show below, and furthermore is not signif-
icant.
Results vary greatly with respect to our controls. Our
dummy for the end of the Cold War is consistently posi-
tively signed, indicating that the decades following the end
of bipolar superpower competition allowed regional parlia-
ments to flourish, but it is not significant, indicating that
there is no strong statistical relationship. Other controls are
less consistent. The incidence of parliamentarization glob-
ally is far less salient than the incidence of parliamentariza-
tion within a geographic region and only reaches a 0.1 sig-
nificance level in conjunction with democracy due to the
spread of both post-1990, suggesting that familiarity with a
specific institutional form is indeed the result of its ready
availability in a particular region or through a particularly
high-profile case of parliamentarization, rather than a func-
tion of the more general occurrence of parliamentarization.
Prosperity, in the form of GDP per capita, has very little
impact, does not reach any level of significance, and fur-
thermore its ratios are inconsistent between models, indi-
cating it has no measurable influence on parliamentariza-
tion. Finally, the presence of hegemons has a mixed result.
Compared to our baseline category, which captures the ex-
istence of an autocratic hegemon and a balance between an
autocratic and a democratic hegemon or the absence of a
hegemon, democratic hegemons appear to reduce the like-
lihood of parliamentarization, though the results are not
consistently significant. On the other hand, the presence
of a democratizing hegemon appears to accelerate parlia-
mentarization; in any case, the presence of such democra-
tizing hegemons is strongly concentrated in Southeast Asia
and Africa.
To explore the substantive effects of our independent
variables, we examine their estimated survival functions, as
shown in Figure 3. To show the marginal effects, we distin-
guish between “high” (above the mean) and “low” (below
the mean). Our figures extend the possible age of the re-
gional organization beyond the sixty years in our analysis,
as some already existed in 1950, though we have only one
case of left-censoring, as the Council of Europe’s parliamen-
tary assembly was established in 1949. Furthermore, the ef-
fects we present are based on Model 5, which includes all
right-hand-side variables, and we display the results as the
proportion of all regional organizations that have adopted a
parliament at any given regional organization age (the “fail-
ure” event), rather than the proportion that survived (i.e.,
did not parliamentarize).
As can be inferred from Figure 3, delegation is highly
significant, and this is reflected in the especially rapid pace
of parliamentarization in the first years of an organization’s
existence, followed by a linear increase in the hazard until
forty-five years of organizational existence for regional or-
ganizations with substantial levels of delegation. In general,
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Figure 3. Estimated survival functions
such organizations adopt parliaments at a median age of
five, much faster than the baseline of forty-one, and their
chance of doing so is three times as high as regional organi-
zations with low delegation, up to a likelihood of 95 percent
for organizations near the maximum delegation. Most such
regional organizations have adopted parliaments by 2010,
with a few notable holdouts, including the Gulf Cooperation
Council, the Organization of Arab-Petroleum Exporting
States, and the Organization of American States; in the
first two this is consistent with low levels of supranational-
ization in the Middle East. Conversely, out of all regional
organizations with low delegation, none have adopted a
parliament.
EU engagement also shows a very strong substantive
effect. Within five years, fully half of regional organizations
that have been in close contact with the EU will have
adopted a parliament, and in general such regional orga-
nizations are up to 70 percent more likely to do so than
organizations that engage with the EU only on a limited
basis or not at all. The effect tapers off, though remains
significant, in the longer term. This indicates that the influ-
ence of the EU is particularly pronounced in the critical first
years of an organization’s existence, where its institutions
may be more easily shaped. By 2010, out of the regional
organizations that have engaged closely with the EU, only
the South Pacific Commission and the Pacific Islands Forum
have not adopted parliaments. In contrast, parliamentariza-
tion in West African organizations has occurred without
particularly strong engagement with the EU, even though
policy-makers in Africa are generally quite familiar with EU
institutions through the long-standing relationship between
the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, which
our EU engagement variable does not capture.
Regional emulation is the final key driver of our results. It
is particularly strong in Europe, Africa, and Latin America,
and comparatively weak elsewhere. In general, it shortens
parliamentarization to a median of twenty-seven years, sim-
ilar to the effect of EU engagement, and highly dependent
on the region, with the greatest impact in Africa and Latin
America; a lesser but nonetheless strong impact in Europe,
where median parliamentarization is accelerated by eigh-
teen years; and almost no impact in Asia and the Middle
East, where there are very few organizations that have par-
liaments. However, the effect weakens after thirty-five years,
with the maximum hazard at fifteen. This is unlike dele-
gation and EU engagement, whose effects only strengthen
over time, eventually plateauing at around thirty-five to forty
years, and the risk is less than in the case of either. Whereas
regional organizations with a very high level of delegation
have likelihoods of adopting a parliament greater than 95
percent, for an organization located in a region with very
strong parliamentarization, such as Africa (67 percent of re-
gional organizations have parliaments in 2010) or Europe
(80 percent of regional organizations have parliaments in
2010), its effect would only lead to a 90 percent likelihood
over the course of four decades, holding delegation and EU
engagement constant, and is thus similar to the impact of
EU engagement.
Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of our results, we apply three sets of
checks. First, we disaggregate our compound EU engage-
ment variable into its constituent elements (EU funding and
EU contacts) and run our analysis with the EU contacts
component only. One may suspect that EU funding oper-
ates through incentives rather than through cognitive chan-
nels, so we exclude it in our robustness checks. We also use
a stricter interpretation of EU contacts, which exclusively
captures contacts and exchanges at the parliamentary level.
This disaggregated analysis demonstrates that our results re-
garding EU engagement are not driven solely by EU fund-
ing, but also by the web of contacts and exchanges led by the
EU. The results of the disaggregated analysis, shown in On-
line Appendix D.1, confirm the results of our main analysis
and indicate that EU engagement in its various incarnations
is a key driver for parliamentarization.
Our second set of robustness checks examines the in-
fluence of time to ensure that our results are not affected
by modeling choices related to the passage of time. In the
main analysis, we include substantive controls strongly cor-
related with time, namely global emulation and post-1990.
But because one may suspect that organizational maturity
may affect the result, we also stratify the sample by age. We
further conduct a stricter analysis, stratifying by age and
replacing the global emulation and the post-1990 controls
with a year count. Tables D.2 and D.3 in the Online Ap-
pendix present the results. The results do not substantially
vary from those of our main analysis, and the strong drivers
we identified—delegation, EU engagement, and regional
emulation—remain highly significant.
Finally, our third set of checks concerns our assumption
that the distribution of the survival function is not a sig-
nificant driver of our results. To this end, we conduct our
analysis first using a Weibull distribution, then again us-
ing a Gompertz distribution. Our results, shown in Online
Appendix D.4 and D.5, are in concordance with our main
TOBIAS LENZ, ALEXANDR BURILKOV, AND LORA VIOLA 1103




Delegation to secretariat Weak
Democratic organization No
Predicted outcome No parliamentary institution
Cognitive Model
EU engagement High
Regional emulation Low (but growing)
Predicted outcome Creation of parliamentary institution
analysis in Table 2, indicating that our assumption regard-
ing the Coxmodel and the survival distribution function was
correct.
Case Study: Regional Parliamentarization in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
The most interesting result of the statistical analysis is the
support we find for the hypothesis that environmental ref-
erents matter for the creation of regional parliaments. To
study this hypothesis in more detail, we provide a case study
of regional parliamentarization in ASEAN, a regional eco-
nomic and security organization founded in 1967 by five
Southeast Asian countries that granted the long-standing
ASEAN Interparliamentary Assembly (AIPA) consultative
competences in regional decision-making in 2010. The case
study allows us to trace the causal mechanism that we posit,
namely that legitimacy loss and resulting pressures for in-
stitutional change can derive from a mismatch between an
organization and a cognitive exemplar against which it is as-
sessed. ASEAN presents a useful case because its parliamen-
tary institution emerged with a nondemocratic membership
and with very limited supranational competence.
As summarized in Table 3, ASEAN closely conforms to
Gerring’s (2007, 238) “pathway case” logic in that “the
causal effect of X1 on Y can be isolated from other poten-
tially confounding factors.” Using original primary material,
such as meeting documents, speeches and interviews, and a
novel reading of secondary sources, we examine the sources
of legitimacy loss in ASEAN, as perceived by relevant audi-
ences, and governments’ strategic reaction to it. The case
illustrates how perceived deviations of the organization’s in-
stitutional status quo from specific external referents con-
tributed to its loss of legitimacy among important elite audi-
ences inside and outside of the organization in the 1990s
and early 2000s. Member-state governments sought to re-
verse this by strategically aligning the organization’s institu-
tional framework with that of other regional organizations
that appeared more legitimate and set the standard of nor-
mative appropriateness, leading to the creation of a parlia-
mentary institution, namely AIPA.
Sources of Legitimacy Loss
The end of the Cold War marked an important turning
point in the evolution of ASEAN’s legitimacy. While the
organization was able to gradually enhance its legitimacy
during its first twenty-five years—primarily by maintaining
peace among postcolonial states with a history of nationalist
conflict and by bolstering these states against internal
challenges (Acharya 2001)—the widespread recognition of
its right to rule was increasingly questioned by important
organizational stakeholders from the mid-1990s onward.
Criticism mainly targeted the state-centric nature of re-
gional cooperation in ASEAN, thereby challenging a key
practice of the organization (see Ba 2013, 140). What has
become known as the “ASEAN way” denotes an informal
and radically consensual style of decision-making that relies
heavily on small-scale contacts among state leaders, gen-
erating a process of what Acharya (2003, 376) has termed
“elite-centric regional socialization.” Even though the
ASEAN way had arguably contributed to the organization’s
initial success, a variety of actors inside and outside of the
organization, including academics, civil society groups, and
popular commentators, started advocating for more societal
involvement (see, for example, Caballero-Anthony 2004).
The 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis seemed to confirm
these criticisms. The organization’s utter failure to manage
a common reaction “shattered ASEAN’s credibility as a
regional leader and an economic regime” (Narine 2002,
139). ASEAN governments found themselves confronted
with unprecedented criticism from a variety of important
stakeholders.
In the early 2000s, ASEAN’s legitimacy had reached its
lowest point since the organization’s creation in 1967. What
were the main sources of this unprecedented loss of legit-
imacy that paved the way for regional parliamentarization
later on? We argue that it cannot be explained by incongru-
ence between changing organizational features stemming
from increasing supranationalism or changes in underlying
social norms induced by the democratization of member
states. Instead, the primary source of this legitimacy loss was
changing perceptions of the organization among important
external stakeholders, as strict adherence to the ASEAN way
seemed increasingly at odds with the changing practices of
important reference organizations.
The supranationalization argument has the weakest em-
pirical support. The degree of supranationalism in ASEAN
barely changed in the 1990s. Even today, the organization is
widely characterized by actors inside and outside of ASEAN
as “an intergovernmental organization where the power lies
with the member states” (Collins 2008, 319). Under the
Charter, all decisions continue to be taken by consensus
(no pooling), and the delegation of competences to the
ASEAN Secretariat remains circumscribed. In 1992, the Sec-
retariat did gain some agenda-setting powers to “initiate, ad-
vise, coordinate, and implement ASEAN activities” (Manila
Protocol 1992, Arts. 4a and b), but this change was modest.
Nowhere in the ASEAN records, including in the records
of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO),
which are littered with references to, and justifications of,
the idea of creating an ASEAN Parliament (AIPO 2003;
AIPA 2013), or in the vast secondary literature could we find
any passage that would suggest that legitimacy loss was a re-
sult of delegation (or pooling).
Although there is more empirical support for the democ-
ratization argument, it hardly constitutes the main source of
ASEAN’s legitimacy loss prior to the early 2000s. Influential
member states—notably, the Philippines, Thailand, Indone-
sia and, to a more limited extent, Malaysia—embarked
upon political liberalization, even democratization, in the
1990s, and various studies have shown convincingly that this
has affected cooperation in ASEAN. For example, democ-
ratization facilitated the emergence of more independent
nonstate actors that advanced “increasingly vociferous de-
mands . . . to democratize regional governance by creating
more participatory channels” (Rüland 2014, 251). However,
these demands from relatively weak social actors occurred
mainly throughout the first decade of the 2000s, so their
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impact is difficult to identify as a major driver of legiti-
macy loss. Most experts agree that, especially in the early
2000s, the state-centric nature of regionalism in the region
continued to enjoy widespread legitimacy among member
governments. As Acharya notes, “[d]emocratic transitions
in three out of the four cases in Southeast Asia (Philippines
1986, Thailand 1991–1992, Cambodia 1993, and Indonesia
1998) over the past [fifteen] years have not produced a
regime [that] has willingly undermined its state-centric
regionalism” (Acharya 2003, 380). Enlargement of ASEAN
to a set of highly authoritarian states in the 1990s rein-
forced, rather than undermined, the idea of state-centrism
in ASEAN (Ba 2013, 148–49). Democratization in this case
cannot provide a strong explanation for legitimacy loss.
Our third hypothesis, the cognitive emulation argument,
emphasizes changing perceptions due to growing inconsis-
tency between an organization and available cognitive ref-
erents. A first indication of this argument is that the most
severe criticism of ASEAN’s state-centric nature during the
1990s came from external actors, who assessed the organiza-
tion by reference to other organizations that they are most
familiar with. As two leading scholars conclude, the “most
acutely felt legitimacy challenge for ASEAN has come from
states and interstate groups outside ASEAN,” including in-
ternational organizations such as the World Bank, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, and the European Union, and
states such as the United States, Canada, and Australia (Ba
2013, 141; see also Rüland 2014). As participation by non-
state actors became increasingly seen as a prerequisite for
transparency and accountability, many IOs institutionalized
access in the 1980s and 1990s, thereby rendering them less
state-centric (Reimann 2006). Among many international
stakeholders, strong adherence to the ASEAN way appeared
increasingly out of sync with these emerging institutional
“best practices.” As one European Commission official re-
marked,
[w]e have long complained that ASEAN is overly dom-
inated by member-state governments, even individ-
ual leaders. It lacks “societal” involvement. . . . The
EU experience has shown how important societal rep-
resentation is for the legitimacy of an integration pro-
cess. . . . In the 1990s, many other [international] orga-
nizations opened up to nonstate actors. I think this was
the time when it became clear also to others [other
international actors] that ASEAN’s practices have to
change.9
Relatedly, a good governance discourse that was advo-
cated by many international actors at the time associated the
idea of state-centrism not with ASEAN’s success but with in-
transparent and unaccountable practices. As an official from
the Asian Development Bank explained,
[i]nternational financial institutions were particularly
vocal in criticizing ASEAN in the wake of the [Asian]
financial crisis. They wanted member states—but also
the organization as a whole—to become more trans-
parent and accountable. . . . This entailed pressure [on
ASEAN] to become less state-centric. One important
argument was . . . that accountability requires wider
societal involvement. This was becoming an interna-
tional best practice at the time. . . . These criticisms
marked a real dent in ASEAN’s legitimacy.10
While both quotes already hint at the cognitive micro-
dynamics of legitimacy judgments based on comparisons
9Author interview at the EU Delegation to ASEAN, Jakarta, August 31, 2009.
10Author interview, Manila, September 28, 2009.
with available referents, this idea may best be illustrated by
the behavior and thinking of local parliamentarians from
within the region, who have been among the most vocal
advocates of regional parliamentarization. Since the 1980s,
the creation of a regional parliament has been regularly dis-
cussed in AIPO. Studies commissioned by AIPO to assess the
prospects of an ASEAN parliament regularly mention the
European Parliament and other parliamentary bodies as im-
portant reference points for such ideas. For example, AIPO
General Assembly Resolution No. 12GA/1991/Res/0–18 re-
solved “to recommend that the Thai National Group . . .
conduct an in-depth study of the merits and demerits of an
ASEAN Parliament, along the lines of the European Parlia-
ment or other regional parliaments” (AIPA 2013). Implicitly,
this statement suggests that the creation of an ASEAN Par-
liament is worth considering because many other regional
organizations have one.
Consider the activism of Jose de Venecia, former Speaker
of the Philippine House of Representatives and former pres-
ident of AIPO, one of the most ardent advocates of the cre-
ation of a parliamentary institution in ASEAN. In 2003, de
Venecia codrafted a Philippine report that reinvigorated in-
terest in the idea of establishing an ASEAN parliamentary
institution (AIPA 2013). It came at a moment when his in-
volvement in international parliamentary bodies (and that
of many other parliamentarians from the region) was surg-
ing. In 1998, he was elected vice president of the Chris-
tian Democratic International, in 1999 he was inducted into
the newly established Association of Asian Parliaments for
Peace (AAPP), and in 2000 he cofounded the International
Conference of Asian Political Parties. His biography is lit-
tered with descriptions of how this international involve-
ment shaped his thinking on the requirements of cooper-
ation in his own region (Decker 2008, for example, 325). In
interviews, a Singaporean AIPO/AIPA delegate stated that
advocates of an ASEAN parliamentary institution “saw the
European Parliament, which is a supranational body power-
ful enough to legislate for the whole region, and that’s what
they saw themselves doing.”11 A government official simi-
larly claimed that “they saw that the EU has a parliament,
and thought: ‘Why not us?’”12 Consider a speech delivered
by de Venecia to the ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in January
2007 in order to make the case for regional parliamenta-
rization:
To keep pace with ASEAN’s progress toward commu-
nity, AIPO (now called AIPA) itself is moving toward
an ASEAN Interparliamentary Assembly (AIPA)—on
the model of continental legislatures: the European
Parliament, born in 1962; the Latin-American Parlia-
ment, born in 1964; and the African Parliament, born
in 2004, that are already well established.
Indeed, Asia—cradle of the great civilizations, cra-
dle of the great religions, and cradle of the great
cultures—lags far behind the other continents in this
global movement toward the establishment of re-
gional parliaments. . . .
Given these precedents, we expect that our ASEAN re-
gional parliament would have a key role . . . in the
historic process of Southeast Asian integration . . . .
(de Venecia 2007, 5–6, our emphasis)
11Author interview, Singapore, September 2009.
12Author interview with Singaporean government official, Singapore, August
2009.
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These diverse pieces of evidence not only suggest that
comparisons with available reference organizations were a
major impetus for parliamentary demands but also indicate
that ASEAN was seen as inadequate, even illegitimate, be-
cause it displayed institutional discrepancies when compared
to other important organizations. ASEAN leaders came to
realize that, as Secretary-General Severino noted, they had
to change ASEAN in a manner that responded “to the needs
of ASEAN’s people today” (Severino 2006, 37).
Parliamentarization as a Legitimation Strategy
How did ASEAN governments react to this loss of their
organization’s legitimacy? We suggest that regional parlia-
mentarization was one result (among several) of member
governments’ collective attempt to reestablish organi-
zational legitimacy. The strategic response consisted of
aligning the organization’s institutional framework with
that of other organizations that appeared more legitimate
and successful. Initially, policy-makers simply emulated the
discourse that appeared increasingly widespread among
IOs to silence growing criticisms of the organization’s
state-centrism. The Vision 2020, adopted at the beginning
of the financial crisis in 1997, endorsed the participatory
discourse of many IOs by outlining the vision of an ASEAN
community where “the civil society is empowered” and in
which the member states are “governed with the consent
and greater participation of the people” (Vision 2020).
Eventually, governments realized that actual institutional
changes were warranted to silence external and internal
criticisms and to reinstate organizational legitimacy. As
Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s foreign minister at the time, notes,
“ASEANmust strive for relevance. To succeed at this, ASEAN
must be able to get the people of ASEAN to be more di-
rectly and deeply involved in its activities” (Alatas 2001, 7).
The ASEAN Charter was the culmination of a series of in-
stitutional reforms that started with the idea to create an
ASEAN Community in the Bali Concord II. These reforms
aimed to secure “ASEAN’s future relevance, viability, and
effectiveness as an association” (cited in Koh, Manalo, and
Woon 2009, 2). As Rüland (2014, 251) notes, “[a]ware of the
growing pressures, ASEAN opted for . . . accommodating the
normative challenge through partial procedural and institu-
tional concessions” (similarly, Ba 2013, 147). The question
was, what should these look like?
While the idea of creating a parliamentary body in
ASEAN had hitherto “never received serious consideration”
by governments despite long-standing demands (Rüland
and Bechle 2014, 73), this changed around 2005 when
the organization embarked upon the Charter-making pro-
cess. As noted, national parliamentarians from the region
had long advocated for the idea of an ASEAN parliament
that took inspiration from the European Parliament and
other regional parliamentary institutions. These initiatives
received a boost when several regional parliamentarians
visited the European Parliament and the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasburg in 2005,
which “stiffened their resolve to ‘work toward the Asian
Parliamentary Assembly,’” including carving out a stronger
role for AIPO/AIPA (Decker 2008, 327).13 Similarly, the
Eminent Persons Group, nominated by governments to
make recommendations on the Charter, undertook a study
visit to the European Union during their consultations,
where their counterparts emphasized that granting parlia-
13Author interview with Jose de Venecia, Manila, October 2015.
mentarians formalized access to regional decision-making
was a crucial ingredient in rendering an organization more
people-oriented.14 Subsequently, the group recommended
“cultivat[ing] ASEAN as a people-centered organization
and [strengthening] the sense of ownership and belonging
among its people, including enhancing the participation of
. . . AIPA” (Eminent Persons Group 2006, 6). This proposal
was taken up by the High Level Task Force, which was cre-
ated by governments to draft the final Charter. Negotiation
documents and interviews suggest that the idea of more
structured participation by parliamentarians was largely
consensual among governments during the final Charter
negotiations (see the accounts in Koh et al. 2009).
The Charter formally recognized AIPA for the first
time as an associated entity of the organization, alongside
other societal organizations. Even though this initially
did not entail formal consultative competences, govern-
ments intended to render AIPA—as a Summit declaration
notes—“the key partner in government” (ASEAN Summit
2007, emphasis added). Shortly after the Charter entered
into force in December 2008, ASEAN leaders established
regular informal meetings with AIPA representatives, and
a formal participatory channel was established in 2010 in
the form of a discussion forum that institutionalized regular
coordination on AIPA resolutions prior to ASEAN summits
(AIPA 2017, 90; see also Deinla 2013, 15). Defending the
Charter, Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong underscored
the achievement of “establish[ing] greater institutional
accountability and compliance system”—also a reference
to AIPA’s new role—in the interest of “reinforc[ing] the
perception of ASEAN as a serious regional player in the future
of the Asia Pacific region” (ASEAN Summit 2007). It was
now easier for ASEAN officials to claim “new” legitimacy,
because it could be presented as addressing concerns about
overt state-centrism that had induced serious legitimacy
loss in the early 2000s. Policy-makers that had previously
strictly rejected any comparisons with the European Union
suddenly endorsed them in public (see Yukawa 2018 for
a detailed account). High-ranking diplomats noted at an
expert roundtable in Berlin that European integration was
“inspiring ASEAN” (BMBF 2012; similarly, see accounts
in Koh et al. 2009). Similarly, government officials, such
as Malaysian foreign minister Syed Hamid Albar, acknowl-
edged that emulating institutional models from other re-
gional organizations “gives ASEAN respectability” (Rüland
and Bechle 2014, 71). This statement captures the idea that
aligning an organization’s institutional framework with that
of other organizations perceived as more legitimate is a
viable strategy for responding to legitimacy challenges.
Conclusion
Even though questions of institutional change are receiving
increased attention in the literature, we know little, both
theoretically and empirically, about legitimacy as a potential
driver of change. Drawing on the case of parliamentariza-
tion in regional organizations, this article seeks to remedy
this weakness by proposing that international institutional
change occurs not only in response to changes in power and
interests, but also because of the changing appropriateness
of institutions. We identify three mechanisms by which le-
gitimacy loss can lead to institutional change, emphasizing
changes in organizational features, norms, and perceptions.
In the empirical test, we find robust statistical support for
14Author interview with Fidel Ramos, September 2009.
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the idea that the empowerment of a regional secretariat,
engagement with the European Union as a key exemplar,
and parliamentarization in neighboring organizations
enhance the probability of parliamentarization within a
regional organization. The pooling of decision-making and
the democratization of an organization’s membership, in
contrast, do not. These findings lend credence to the cogni-
tive model of legitimacy-driven institutional change, which
posits that changes in available reference organizations
are a major source of variation in legitimacy and thus of
pressures for institutional change. We also show, through a
case study of regional parliamentarization in ASEAN, how
organizational referents can shape key stakeholders’ legit-
imacy judgments of an organization and the institutional
remedies they adopt.
Taken together, the conceptual and empirical arguments
advanced in this article suggest that institutional change in
IOs occurs not only when powerful actors seek to secure
their dominance or when member states seek to enhance
organizational efficiency, but change can also result because
policy-makers seek to counter a loss of organizational legiti-
macy.
A focus on legitimacy and international institutional
change recovers a key element of constructivist theory that
has been neglected in much recent theorizing, which tends
to focus on concepts such as identity, norms, and ideas.
Existing research tends to view legitimacy as a force for
stability in international politics, stabilizing the status quo
when the distribution of power and of interests shift. In
this article, in contrast, we emphasize legitimacy (loss) as an
important source of institutional change. In fact, the funda-
mental Weberian assumption that policy-makers are sensi-
tive to changes in legitimacy implies that legitimacy loss is a
powerful source of behavioral change, able to unsettle even
deeply ingrained, seemingly stable patterns of behavior. We
show that this long-standing logic applies also to interna-
tional institutions and institutional change—a field of study
that has thus far been dominated by a focus on power and
interests.
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